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INTRODUCTION
The specter of identity theft looms over the American consumer.
Over seventeen million Americans had their identities stolen in 2014,
and identity theft has been the most popular complaint among
American consumers for fifteen consecutive years.1 Accordingly, as
consumers become more sophisticated guardians of their own
personally identifiable information (“PII”), they are becoming
increasingly anxious about the data security practices of corporations
that process or store consumer data.2 In the absence of far-reaching
congressional or administrative mandates,3 data breach litigation
should help establish data security standards to guide entities and
reassure consumers. Regrettably, too many consumers who bring data
breach claims are denied standing before those claims can proceed to
the merits because the plaintiffs cannot convince courts that they
have suffered injuries-in-fact, even after data thieves accessed but did
not misuse their PII.4
In a 2013 case, Clapper v. Amnesty International,5 the Supreme
Court affirmed that a plaintiff might be able to satisfy the injury-infact requirement on the grounds that the plaintiff faced a substantial
risk of harm, rather than having to show that the harm will certainly
occur.6 However, this decision did little to open up federal courts to
1. ERIKA HARRELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2014, at
1 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit14.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6MV-YCD4];
Identity Theft Tops FTC’s Consumer Complaint Categories Again in 2014, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/02/identity
-theft-tops-ftcs-consumer-complaint-categories-again-2014 [https://perma.cc/4EQV-QBK7].
2. MARY MADDEN & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS’ ATTITUDES
ABOUT PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND SURVEILLANCE 7 (May 20, 2015), http://www
.pewinternet.org/files/2015/05/Privacy-and-Security-Attitudes-5.19.15_FINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8WVE-D3GU] (finding that just four percent of Americans are “very confident”
and twenty-two percent are “somewhat confident” that companies or retailers that
maintain records of their activity will keep that information private and secure).
3. Unfortunately for consumers, most of the data security regulations that the
federal government promulgates either only apply to a narrow set of industries or are only
sporadically enforced. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6821 (2015) (covering financial
institutions); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012)
(protecting educational information); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-2, 1320d-9 (2015) (protecting
healthcare information).
4. Miles L. Galbraith, Comment, Identity Crisis: Seeking a Unified Approach to
Plaintiff Standing for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, 62 AM. U.
L. REV. 1365, 1378–79 (2013) (“A survey of district court rulings in data breach cases
reveals a history of inconsistent outcomes, but most courts support the conclusion that
plaintiffs whose data has been breached, but not yet misused, have not suffered injury-infact to satisfy the standing requirements under Article III.”).
5. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
6. Id. at 1150 n.5.
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data breach litigants. While the Court in Clapper approved the
“certainly impending” standard as the appropriate measure of a
future injury’s cognizability, the Court’s application of the standard
was devoid of substantive, and particularly empirical, meaning.
Adding to the confusion, the Court observed in a footnote that an
alternative standard, one that insists on a “substantial risk” of future
harm, remains viable, but the Court failed to explain how the two
standards differ or operate together.7 Consequently, since Clapper,
lower courts have disagreed about the requisite imminence of PII
misuse that a consumer’s allegations must demonstrate in order for
the consumer to establish an injury.8
More broadly, the application of the injury-in-fact requirement
in data breach litigation forces courts to make at least two normative
choices that lead to doctrinal unpredictability. When applying the
factual injury requirement, courts must decide which injuries ought to
be cognizable and when the likelihood of an injury is sufficiently
imminent to recognize the injury.9 This framework stands in stark
contrast to a positive legal injury requirement that would simply ask a
court to determine an injury’s cognizability with reference to the
relevant substantive law.10 Instead, in making these normative
choices, a court can easily dismiss a claim on jurisdictional grounds
that may well be compensable under substantive law.11 This result is
irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s modern theoretical
justification for the injury-in-fact requirement as a restraint on the
unconstitutional expansion of judicial power.12
Courts could reduce doctrinal confusion in data breach litigation,
and thus encourage more predictable outcomes, by either recognizing
a different factual injury or by requiring only a nominal probability of
the injury’s occurrence to render that harm sufficiently imminent.
Professor Andrew Hessick has persuasively advocated for a low
minimum risk requirement to render an injury sufficiently imminent
for standing purposes.13 The ideal solution for the problems that data
breach claims pose would be to align the proper constitutional
standard for assessing the imminence of future harms, the
“substantial risk” standard, with Professor Hessick’s minimum risk

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Part IV.
See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 231–33 (1988).
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part III.
F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 65–73 (2012).
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requirement.14 Nonetheless, courts can still remain faithful to
contemporary standing doctrine and still reduce the unpredictability
that results from their application of the normative factual injury
requirement with a simpler solution: adopting the rule that the
exposure of sensitive PII resulting from a data breach is itself a
cognizable injury.15
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the origins
of standing doctrine and the injury-in-fact requirement. Part II
discusses how courts have applied the “certainly impending” standard
to determine whether a plaintiff has satisfied the injury-in-fact
requirement in Clapper and other recent data breach cases. Part III
argues that the “certainly impending” standard applied in Clapper is
inapposite in data breach cases, so courts should instead apply the
alternative “substantial risk” standard. Finally, Part IV argues that
courts should adopt the rule that the exposure of sensitive PII
resulting from a data breach, even absent misuse of the data, is the
applicable injury in data breach cases. Doing so would lead courts to
reach more predictable and theoretically sound outcomes and would
help provide corporations and consumers with practical guidance on
reasonable data security practices.
I. BACKGROUND ON STANDING DOCTRINE AND THE INJURY-INFACT REQUIREMENT
Standing doctrine derives from the Article III jurisdictional grant
to the judiciary to hear cases or controversies.16 A “case or
controversy” only occurs between parties that are adverse with
respect to a particular matter.17 Standing doctrine thus purports to
ensure that courts entertain actual disputes by mandating that truly
adverse parties litigate a particular claim.18 To this end, “[t]o establish
Article III standing, an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
redressable by a favorable ruling.’ ”19 The constitutional justification
for standing doctrine is merely to ensure that adverse parties litigate a
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
17. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1911); see also Antonin Scalia,
The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983) (“There is no case or controversy, the reasoning has gone,
when there are no adverse parties with personal interest in the matter.”).
18. Id.
19. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Monsanto
Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)).
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given matter, but in recent decades, the Court has applied standing
doctrine as an exclusionary tool to render certain alleged injuries that
give rise to disputes between adverse parties incapable of judicial
resolution.20
Standing doctrine is a relatively recent phenomenon in American
constitutional law. The Supreme Court has only discussed standing as
a derivation of the Article III jurisdictional grant over “cases or
controversies” eight times in total before 1965, the first time being in
1944.21 However, standing has since become a necessary prerequisite
for any litigant that seeks to bring a claim before a federal court.22
The brief discussion that follows, though not an exhaustive history of
the doctrine, helps to explain why the Court has applied a more
exacting factual injury test in cases, including data breach cases, that
threaten the balance of powers between the branches of government.
A. Early Standing Doctrine
Before 1920, a plaintiff could bring a cognizable claim so long as
he could allege that the defendant had violated one of his legal
rights.23 However, as Congress began to construct the modern
administrative state during the Progressive Era and through the New
Deal, litigants began to bring claims that challenged new expansions
of federal power.24 Notably, in cases where these inquiries foreclosed
the plaintiffs’ claims, there was neither a common law right at stake, a
private right of action created under a statute, nor a constitutional
provision that litigants could claim was invaded through the
challenged governmental actions.25 In concurring opinions, Justices
Brandeis and Frankfurter sought to develop inquiries akin to modern
standing doctrine that limited challenges from citizens who sought to
invalidate the new statutory schemes without demonstrating a

20. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (holding that a plaintiff who
was placed in a chokehold by two officers of the Los Angeles Police Department lacked
standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief against the city); F. Andrew Hessick,
Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 278 (2008); see
Scalia, supra note 17, at 882.
21. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 169 (1992).
22. Hessick, supra note 20, at 276.
23. See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 170 (“[W]hat we now consider to be the question of
standing was answered by deciding whether Congress or any other source of law had
granted the plaintiff a right to sue.”).
24. Id. at 179.
25. See id. at 180.
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personal stake in the matter before the Court.26 Nonetheless, the
conception of justiciability that prevailed at that time was simple: any
person could seek judicial redress for the invasion of a legal right.27
B.

The Growth of the Administrative State

Modern standing doctrine has its origins in judicial
interpretations of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).28 The
APA provides a private right of action to individuals who are injured
because of an agency’s action.29 Under the relevant provision, “[a]
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to review thereof.”30 Congress likely
intended this provision to codify existing law by allowing litigants to
bring claims that implicated agency actions and arose from one of
three distinct legal injuries: the invasion of a common law right, the
infringement of a statutory right, or a harm for which a governing
statute provided a private right of action.31
As the reach of the administrative state expanded in the 1960s,
courts began to allow beneficiaries of agency actions to challenge
those actions. An object of an agency action could still challenge the
action under the prevailing legal injury test.32 However, a beneficiary
of an agency’s regulatory action would not suffer an invasion of a
legal right as a result of an agency’s regulation of some other actor.33
For example, imagine that a fisher sought to challenge an
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) determination about
whether a polluter could dump waste in a water source that supports
her livelihood. Under that scenario, however, the EPA action would

26. Id. at 179–80; see, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 150–53 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (concluding in suits “challeng[ing]
governmental action,” that “if no comparable common-law right exists and no such
constitutional or statutory interest has been created, relief is not available judicially”);
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341–56 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(describing the bounds of justiciability doctrine including the observation that “[t]he Court
will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he
is injured by its operation”).
27. See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 180.
28. See id. at 181.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
30. Id.
31. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 181–82.
32. See id. at 184. For example, an object of an agency action could be an automobile
manufacturer that is regulated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
33. See id. For example, a beneficiary of an agency’s regulatory action could be a
consumer of a water source regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency.
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not have resulted in the fisher suffering a cognizable injury under the
prevailing conception of standing doctrine. Thus, courts began to
relax the legal injury test in order to allow a wider range of
stakeholders to challenge administrative acts.34
Pursuing this liberalization of access to the judiciary, in 1970, the
Court replaced the legal injury requirement with a factual injury
requirement that forms the basis of modern standing doctrine. In
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp,35 the
Court announced that in order to establish standing, (1) a plaintiff
must suffer an “injury in fact” and (2) a plaintiff must prove that “the
interest sought to be protected . . . is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question.”36 The injury-in-fact requirement was intended
to be a factual—and thus non-normative—inquiry that would open
courts to a broader range of stakeholders who suffered some wrong as
a result of administrative action.37 Since Camp, satisfying the injuryin-fact requirement has been necessary to establish jurisdiction under
Article III, especially in separation of powers cases.38
C.

Separation of Powers Concerns

In 1983, while sitting on the D.C. Circuit, then-Judge Antonin
Scalia authored an influential law review article, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,39 that
would in retrospect seem prophetic. Scalia argued that standing
doctrine is a means by which courts fulfill “their traditional
undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against
impositions of the majority.”40 Moreover, he asserted that the
requirement must be applied such that only an individual who is the
object of a challenged government action and suffers a concrete
injury distinct from that suffered by the general public can acquire
standing to challenge a governmental action.41 According to Scalia, a

34. See id.; see, e.g., Office of Commc’n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994, 1000–06 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (discussing how television viewers had standing under
the Federal Communications Act to contest the renewal of a broadcast license).
35. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
36. Id. at 152–54; Sunstein, supra note 21, at 185 (“The zone-of-interest test was
intended to be exceptionally lenient.”).
37. See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 230.
38. See id.
39. See generally Scalia, supra note 17 (discussing standing’s role in separation of
powers cases).
40. Id. at 894.
41. Id. at 895.
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court applies the injury-in-fact requirement in separation of powers
cases to ensure that a plaintiff is the person to whom the framers
intended to provide judicial—rather than political—redress.42
Therefore, in such cases, he asserted that a court would apply the
injury test in a more exacting manner as a jurisdictional requirement
in order to safeguard the constitutional role of the judiciary.43
After joining the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife44 reflected the philosophical
conceptualization of standing that he expressed years before.45 In
Lujan, the plaintiffs brought a citizen suit under the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”).46 The ESA required the federal
government to consult with the secretary of the interior to ensure that
the expenditure of federal funds did not “jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species.”47 In 1978, the secretary of
commerce and the secretary of the interior promulgated a joint
regulation that applied the ESA to federal expenditures in foreign
nations,48 but the U.S. Department of the Interior changed that
position in a subsequent regulation issued in 1986.49
In seeking a declaratory judgment that the second regulation
violated the ESA, members of the plaintiff environmental
organizations claimed that they had observed specific endangered
species in their habitats and that they intended to do so again.50
However, the plaintiffs could not attest to when their return visit
would occur, and therefore, the Court held that the plaintiff
organizations had failed to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.51
The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ injuries were not “certainly
impending” as required under standing doctrine because the plaintiffs
failed to introduce evidence that would render their stated intent to
return to the foreign nations sufficiently imminent.52
42. Id. at 894–95 (explaining that “there is no reason to remove the matter from the
political process and place it in the courts” simply because a plaintiff may care more about
the generalized injury than others).
43. See id. at 895.
44. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
45. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.
46. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557–58.
47. Id. at 558 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988)).
48. Id. (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 874, 874 (Jan. 4, 1978)).
49. Id. at 558–59 (citing 50 C.F.R § 402.01 (1991)).
50. Id. at 563–64.
51. Id.
52. Id. (“[T]he affiants’ profession of an ‘inten[t]’ to return to the places they had
visited before—where they will presumably, this time, be deprived of the opportunity to
observe animals of the endangered species—is simply not enough. Such ‘some day’
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D. Applying Lujan’s Exacting Standing Inquiry in a Recent Case
In Clapper v. Amnesty International, the Supreme Court applied
the “certainly impending” standard outlined in Lujan, which has since
become the leading standard for determining whether an increased
risk of future harm is sufficiently imminent for standing purposes.53 In
Clapper, several organizations challenged the federal government’s
communications surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”).54 Under FISA, the federal
government can obtain an order from the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (“FISC”) that authorizes the government to
intercept communications targeted toward “persons reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign
intelligence information.”55 The respondent organizations asserted
that their members communicated with individuals who were likely
targets of FISA-authorized surveillance.56 As a result, the respondent
organizations argued that their ability to “communicate confidential
information” was compromised, that they were forced to cease having
certain conversations, and that they were compelled to “undertake[]
‘costly and burdensome measures’ ” to ensure that sensitive
communications would remain private.57
Even though the respondent organizations alleged concrete
harms resulting from FISA-authorized surveillance, the Court held
that those harms were not “certainly impending.”58 In so holding, the
Court reasoned that the respondents could not demonstrate that the
federal government would target their particular communications
because FISA prohibited the government from targeting domestic
members of their organizations.59 Furthermore, the Court stated that
the respondents could not anticipate that the government would
target any particular foreign individual with whom the organizations
might communicate because the organizations had no actual

intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of
when the some day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury
that our cases require.” (alteration in original)).
53. Unlike Lujan, Clapper is a data collection case. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142 (2013).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1144 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012)).
56. Id. at 1145.
57. Id. at 1145–46 (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138
(No. 11-1025).
58. Id. at 1150.
59. Id. at 1148.
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knowledge of the government’s targeting practices.60 Even if the
government did target individuals with whom the respondents
communicated, the Court concluded that the organizations could not
demonstrate that the FISC would authorize the government to do so,
that the government’s data collection would succeed, or that the
intercepted communications would include the respondents’
communications with a targeted individual.61 Finally, because the
respondents could not demonstrate concrete injury, the Court
decided that the respondents’ efforts to avoid FISA-authorized
surveillance were not “fairly traceable” to the challenged government
acts.62
Clapper is critical to the analysis that follows for two reasons.
First, Clapper is a separation of powers case in that the plaintiffs
sought to invoke the power of the federal courts to invalidate a law
that Congress duly enacted.63 In such cases, the Court explicitly
applies standing doctrine in an “especially rigorous” manner;64 thus,
the rationale for applying a similarly exacting inquiry in common law
claims between two private parties is lacking. Second, Clapper
specifically preserves an alternative standard to determine whether a
future injury is sufficiently imminent for standing purposes.
According to the Court, a plaintiff can also establish standing by
showing that there is a “substantial risk” that a future harm will
occur.65 Unfortunately, the Court utterly failed to distinguish the
“certainly impending” and “substantial risk” standards, and as a
result, the Court did not instruct lower courts on the proper
application of either.66 This failure has produced confusion among
lower courts.

60. Id.
61. Id. at 1149–50.
62. Id. at 1151 (“[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting
harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly
impending.”).
63. See id. at 1146–47.
64. Id. (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997)).
65. Id. at 1150 n.5.
66. See id. (“Our cases do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is
literally certain that the harms they identify will come about. In some instances, we have
found standing based on a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur, which may prompt
plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm.”).
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II. LOWER COURTS APPLYING CLAPPER HAVE REACHED
VARYING RESULTS
When applying Clapper, lower courts have imposed a more
rigorous test on data breach victims who assert that their injuries
result from an increased risk of future harm, regardless of whether
the separation of powers exacting inquiry is triggered. Plaintiffs in
data breach cases often allege injuries that arise from one of three
factual circumstances: (1) unauthorized access to their PII, (2) misuse
of their PII, or (3) misuse of their PII that results in direct economic
loss.67 When a plaintiff claims that a data breach has resulted in direct
economic loss, such as a fraudulent charge on a credit card account
that will not be reimbursed, courts have agreed that the plaintiff has
alleged a cognizable injury sufficient to confer standing.68 Similarly,
when a plaintiff asserts that a data breach has not resulted in direct
economic harm but nonetheless results in a form of misuse, such as an
attempt to open a bank account using the plaintiff’s identity, most
courts seem to agree that a plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact.69
However, when a plaintiff alleges that an unauthorized party has
accessed but not yet misused her data, courts disagree on whether
that plaintiff has alleged a cognizable injury.70 Furthermore, under
Clapper’s holding that the plaintiffs in that case could not
“manufacture standing by incurring costs in anticipation of non-

67. See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Whalen v. Michael Stores Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 577, 580–81 (E.D.N.Y.
2015) (holding that a plaintiff did not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement because she
failed to allege that the fraudulent charges that she suffered after a data breach were not
reimbursed); Burton v. MAPCO Express, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1284–85 (N.D. Ala.
2014) (noting that an “allegation that the charges on [plaintiff’s] account were not
forgiven, and [plaintiff] had to pay for the charges” would satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement).
69. See, e.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015)
(holding that plaintiffs bringing suit based on stolen credit card numbers satisfied the
injury-in-fact requirement because the hack was presumably intended to make fraudulent
charges or to assume the consumers’ identities); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. Backup
Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 31 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Plaintiffs who claim that
their information was, in fact, accessed and misused have alleged an actual injury.”).
70. Compare In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (“[T]o require Plaintiffs to wait until they actually suffer identity theft or credit card
fraud in order to have standing would run counter to the well-established principle that
harm need not have already occurred or be ‘literally certain’ in order to constitute injuryin-fact.”), with Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 657 (S.D. Ohio
2014) (holding “that the increased risk that Plaintiffs will be victims of identity theft [or]
identity fraud . . . at some indeterminate point in the future does not constitute injury
sufficient to confer standing where, as here, the occurrence of such future injury rests on
the criminal actions of independent decisionmakers”).
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imminent harm,”71 most courts have held that a plaintiff who takes
preventative measures such as subscribing to a credit monitoring
service also fails to suffer an injury-in-fact.72
Before Clapper, there was a clear circuit split on the question of
whether a plaintiff in a data breach case could demonstrate that the
plaintiff suffered an injury-in-fact without alleging actual misuse of
the stolen PII.73 But even though Clapper now controls, only one
appellate court has applied that case’s “certainly impending” standard
in data breach litigations.74 That Seventh Circuit decision, Remijas v.
Neiman Marcus Group, LLC,75 and similar opinions from district
courts in the Ninth Circuit,76 suggest that a circuit split may soon reemerge on the question of whether a plaintiff can satisfy the injury-infact requirement without alleging actual misuse of PII.77 Resolving
this question is essential because data breach claims are often brought
when the thieves actually misuse the stolen PII, and identity thieves
can wait an indefinite period of time to fraudulently use the data.78
Thus, a requirement that all plaintiffs suffer actual misuse of their PII
following a data breach could prevent prospective plaintiffs from
bringing viable state law claims until years after their data has been
stolen.79 Courts should instead relax the standing inquiry so that
consumers can vindicate their interests as the applicable law permits,
even if the consumer has not suffered actual misuse of his or her PII.

71. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1155.
72. See, e.g., Green v. eBay Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58047, at *19–22
(E.D. La. May 4, 2015).
73. Peters v. St. Joseph Servs. Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 847, 856 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (“The
Court recognizes that before Clapper, a split existed among the Third, Seventh and Ninth
circuit courts over whether the increased risk of harm stemming from a data security
breach constitutes imminent injury under Article III.”).
74. Neiman Marcus, 794 F.3d at 692–94.
75. 794 F.3d 688.
76. See, e.g., In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1213–14 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (discussing difficulties courts may face when interpreting Clapper).
77. See infra Part II.A.
78. Neiman Marcus, 794 F.3d at 694 (“[S]tolen data may be held for up to a year or
more before being used to commit identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold
or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for years.”
(quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, PERSONAL
INFORMATION: DATA BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING
IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 29 (2007))).
79. See id. at 693–94 (discussing that an alleged risk of future harm was sufficient at
the motion to dismiss stage and allowing the case to proceed).
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A. Not All Courts Agree That Actual Misuse Is the Relevant Harm
Since Clapper, most district courts that sit in circuits other than
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have concluded that the injury-in-fact
requirement is not satisfied unless the plaintiff can allege actual
misuse of the plaintiff’s PII.80 Misuse can take the form of an
unauthorized charge to a credit card, filing a fraudulent tax return, or
an attempt to open an account using the stolen PII.81 Interestingly,
since Clapper, at least four district courts have concluded that actual
misuse is insufficient to demonstrate an injury-in-fact.82 In addition to
misuse, these courts required plaintiffs to allege that they suffered
misuse that resulted in direct economic loss.83
For various reasons, the four cases where courts have demanded
direct economic loss in addition to misuse appear to have limited
precedential value. In one of these cases, despite alleged misuse, the
court held that the plaintiff’s alleged future injury was not imminent
in part because the plaintiff filed the claim thirty-six months after the
data breach incident occurred.84 Another case, In re Barnes & Noble
Pin Pad Litigation,85 was decided by a district court within the
Seventh Circuit and was therefore overruled by Neiman Marcus.86
In the two remaining cases where courts required a showing of
economic harm in addition to actual misuse, the courts explicitly
required the plaintiff to demonstrate that her economic harm would
not be reimbursed. In one of those cases, Whalen v. Michael Stores
Inc.,87 the court curiously placed primary reliance on In re Barnes &
Noble even after the Neiman Marcus decision,88 applied one case
whose analysis contradicted the rule that the court announced in

80. See, e.g., In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F.
Supp. 3d 14, 19 (D.D.C. 2014) (observing that “most [courts] have agreed that the mere
loss of data—without evidence that it has been either viewed or misused—does not
constitute an injury sufficient to confer standing”).
81. See, e.g., Tierney v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 13-CV-6237, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 158750, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2014) (concluding that some plaintiffs in the
case had established Article III standing under the Clapper standard because someone had
attempted to access their bank accounts and opened new cell phone accounts).
82. See infra notes 85–94 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Burton v. MAPCO Express, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1284–85 (N.D.
Ala. 2014).
84. Fernandez v. Leidos, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1087–88 (E.D. Cal. 2015).
85. No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125730 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013).
86. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015).
87. Whalen v. Michael Stores Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 577 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
88. Id. at 580–81.
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Whalen,89 and applied another case (also from a district court in the
Seventh Circuit that was decided before Neiman Marcus) where the
court in fact rejected the contention that the plaintiffs had to prove
that they incurred unreimbursed expenses at the pleading stage.90
Interestingly, in the other case where a court required the plaintiff to
prove that his asserted economic harm would not be reimbursed,
Burton v. MAPCO Express, Inc.,91 the court applied Alabama
common law on tort damages instead of standing doctrine to
determine whether the plaintiff’s asserted injuries were cognizable.92
The Burton court’s application of a legal injury test to determine
whether the plaintiff in that case established injury-in-fact does not fit
within the Supreme Court’s current reliance on a factual injury test.
Still, applying the legal injury test helped the Burton court reach a
more theoretically sound result, which can provide guidance for
future courts dealing with similar cases.93
B.

The Seventh Circuit’s Application of Clapper in Neiman Marcus
and Similar Decisions from District Courts Within the Ninth
Circuit
1. Neiman Marcus

Neiman Marcus is the first federal appellate opinion that applied
Clapper to determine whether asserted injuries arising from a data
breach satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement. In Neiman Marcus,
the retailer discovered that a data breach caused up to 350,000
payment cards to be exposed to unauthorized parties.94 Nine
thousand two hundred of those cards were misused, so the retailer
offered one year of free credit monitoring and identity theft
protection to all individuals whose cards were potentially
89. Id. at 581. Whalen applied a higher standard than the standard applied in In re
Target Corp. Data Securities Breach Litigation, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159 (D. Minn. 2014),
which did not require a demonstration of actual unreimbursed economic harm. Whalen,
153 F. Supp. at 581.
90. Whalen, 153 F. Supp. at 581 (citing In re Michaels Stores Pin Pad Litig., 830 F.
Supp. 2d 518, 527 (N.D. Ill. 2011)).
91. 47 F. Supp. 3d 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2014).
92. Id. at 1284–85 (“Because Resnick does not provide clear direction with respect to
[plaintiff’s] pleading obligation in this consumer data theft action and because Alabama
law governs [plaintiff’s] negligence claim, the Court turns to Alabama law for guidance.”).
But see Smith v. Triad of Ala., LLC, No. 1:14-CV-324-WKW-PWG, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 132514, at *20–23 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 22, 2015) (declining to apply Burton in a data
breach case).
93. See infra Part III.
94. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015).
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compromised.95 In response to the breach, several individuals filed
purported class action complaints that sought to represent all
consumers whose data was breached and that relied on several
common law causes of action.96 The complaints were later
consolidated, and the named plaintiffs of the purported class alleged
distinct factual harms: two named plaintiffs alleged that fraudulent
charges appeared on their payment card accounts, one plaintiff
alleged that her bank informed her that “her debit card had been
compromised,” and another plaintiff alleged that her card was
potentially exposed in the breach.97 The district court dismissed the
consolidated complaint for lack of standing.98
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that two of the plaintiffs’
asserted future injuries sufficed to establish injury-in-fact for all
plaintiffs whose data was potentially exposed in the breach because
the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries demonstrated an increased risk of
identity theft and the necessary present cost of preventative measures
to detect identity theft.99 To reach these holdings, the court applied
the “substantial risk” standard that Clapper explicitly preserved.100 In
holding that the increased susceptibility to identity theft satisfied the
“substantial risk” standard, the court reasoned that the hackers who
stole consumer data must have intended to use that data for
fraudulent purposes.101 The court’s holding that the cost of a
preventative measure—credit monitoring—was an independent
cognizable injury is significant because it rests on a factual distinction
with Clapper that could apply in future data breach cases.
In Clapper, the Supreme Court concluded that costs incurred to
prevent a non-imminent harm could not constitute actual harm.102
The Court justified its conclusion by reasoning that a decision to
allow mitigation expenses to constitute actual harm would allow a

95. Id.
96. Id. at 690–91.
97. Id.
98. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, No. 14 C 1735, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
129574, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014).
99. Neiman Marcus, 794 F.3d at 693–96.
100. Id. at 693.
101. Id. (“Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent
charges or assume those consumers’ identities.”).
102. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1152 (2013) (“Because
respondents do not face a threat of certainly impending interception . . . the costs that they
have incurred to avoid surveillance are simply the product of their fear of surveillance
[and] . . . such a fear is insufficient to create standing.”).
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plaintiff to “manufacture standing.”103 However, the Seventh Circuit
read that conclusion narrowly, stating that the rule in Clapper did not
apply in Neiman Marcus because, unlike the plaintiffs in Clapper, the
Neiman Marcus plaintiffs could confirm that they were exposed to an
independently cognizable risk of harm because they were offered
credit monitoring services as a preventative measure.104 Thus, in
holding that the cost of credit monitoring was itself a cognizable
harm,105 the Seventh Circuit noted that Neiman Marcus’s decision to
offer free credit monitoring for one year to consumers whose data
had been potentially exposed indicated that the consumers’ concern
of impending identity theft was not purely speculative.106
Neiman Marcus suggests two rules that could possibly help
district courts reach more uniform and perhaps doctrinally sound
results in determining whether data breach plaintiffs can establish
standing. The first rule would be that actual misuse is a sufficiently
imminent harm whenever it is apparent that the data thief
purposefully stole PII.107 That rule is enticingly simple and entirely
reconcilable with several recent district court opinions.108
103. Id. at 1151 (“[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting
harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly
impending.”).
104. Neiman Marcus, 794 F.3d at 694 (“[I]t is important not to overread Clapper.
Clapper was addressing speculative harm based on something that may not even have
happened to some or all of the plaintiffs. In our case, Neiman Marcus does not contest the
fact that the initial breach took place. An affected customer, having been notified by
Neiman Marcus that her card is at risk, might think it necessary to subscribe to a service
that offers monthly credit monitoring.”).
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 693–94. The District Court for the District of Maryland has endorsed a
similar test:
[I]n the data breach context, plaintiffs have properly alleged an injury in fact
arising from increased risk of identity theft if they put forth facts that provide
either (1) actual examples of the use of the fruits of the data breach for identity
theft, even if involving other victims; or (2) a clear indication that the data breach
was for the purpose of using the plaintiffs’ personal data to engage in identity
fraud.
Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., No. TDC-15-2125, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66404, at
*15 (D. Md. May 19, 2016). The court indicated that the nature of the compromised PII,
the methods that data thieves use, and confirmation of whether the data has been stolen
may all indicate the data thieves’ purpose. See id. at *16–17.
108. See, e.g., Green v. eBay Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58047, at *15–19
(E.D. La. May 4, 2015) (noting that plaintiffs did not have standing because no actual
misuse of PII occurred); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litig.,
45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding that there was no evidence of actual
misuse of PII because of the thief’s lack of sophistication, meaning the plaintiffs did not
have standing). From these and other cases, it appears as though some courts treat a data
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Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine that courts can apply such a
conclusory test in a consistent manner. Data thieves’ identities and
therefore their intentions are often unknown; thus, even a hacker who
accesses the PII of a large number of consumers could hack into a
system for some purpose other than to defraud consumers. The
second rule Neiman Marcus offers would be that the cost of a
preventative measure like credit monitoring is always a cognizable
harm. To avoid violating the rule announced in Clapper that
mitigation expenses do not constitute actual harm, courts could limit
the application of this second Neiman Marcus rule to cases where
sensitive PII—and not just benign information like a consumer’s
name and address—is exposed.
2. District Courts Within the Ninth Circuit
Three district courts that sit within the Ninth Circuit have also
held that a consumer whose data is disclosed to unauthorized parties
because of a data breach can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement
without alleging misuse.109 In reaching those holdings, each of those
courts applied a Ninth Circuit case, Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.,110
that was decided before Clapper. In Krottner, the Ninth Circuit
applied a less exacting test for demonstrating legal injury on a theory
of increased risk of future harm.111 The plaintiffs in Krottner were
among 97,000 Starbucks employees whose “unencrypted names,
addresses, and social security numbers” were contained on a laptop
that was stolen from the company.112 After the laptop was stolen, the
plaintiff employees enrolled in free credit monitoring services that
Starbucks offered, and just one employee reportedly suffered
misuse.113 Nonetheless, the court held that the plaintiffs’ allegations
satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement.114 In so holding, the court
reasoned that “the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted
personal data” was a “credible threat of real and immediate harm”
and therefore sufficed to establish standing.115

thief’s apparent intent or ability to steal financial data as contributing to the imminence of
impending identity theft.
109. See infra notes 116–25 and accompanying text.
110. 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
111. See infra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
112. Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1140.
113. Id. at 1141 (noting that someone attempted to open a bank account using an
employee’s social security number).
114. Id. at 1143.
115. Id.
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Each of the three district courts that found standing without
allegations of misuse applied Krottner in similar factual circumstances
to reach the same conclusion.116 In the first case, In re Sony Gaming
Networks & Customer Data Security Breach Litigation,117 the plaintiffs
were video game consumers who “provide[d] Sony with personal
identifying information, including their names, mailing addresses,
email addresses, birth dates, credit and debit card information . . . and
login credentials.”118 Sony was subsequently hacked, and the plaintiffs
alleged that their financial information was compromised, although
only one of the plaintiffs alleged misuse.119 In another case, Corona v.
Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc.,120 the plaintiffs were Sony
Entertainment employees who alleged that their personal—including
financial—information was stolen in a data breach and posted on file
sharing websites accessible to identity thieves.121 The plaintiffs also
alleged that the stolen information was used to send threatening emails to the employees and their families.122 Finally, in In re Adobe
Systems Privacy Litigation,123 customers supplied payment card
information that hackers stole and subsequently decrypted, and at
least some of the information later appeared on the Internet.124 The
Adobe court offered the most persuasive rationale for concluding that
the risk of identity theft for plaintiffs whose sensitive PII was exposed
have inherently suffered a sufficiently imminent harm: “[T]o require
Plaintiffs to wait until they actually suffer identity theft or credit card
fraud to have standing would run counter to the well-established
principle that harm need not have already occurred or be ‘literally
certain’ in order to constitute injury-in-fact.”125
However, not every district court within the Ninth Circuit has
reached the same conclusion as the three aforementioned courts. In
factually distinct cases, other district courts within the Ninth Circuit
have not found that plaintiffs suffered cognizable injuries, despite
116. Corona v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., No. 14-CV-09600, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
85865, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 15, 2015); In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d
1197, 1211–14 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec.
Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 961–62 (S.D. Cal. 2014); see infra notes 117–25 and
accompanying text.
117. 996 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
118. Id. at 954.
119. Id. at 955–58.
120. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85865 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2015).
121. Id. at *2, *5.
122. Id. at *6.
123. 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
124. Id. at 1215.
125. Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013)).
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asserting that personal information was disclosed in data breaches.126
In those cases, the courts’ analyses turned on the following
considerations: the length of time between the date on which the data
breach occurred and the complaint was filed,127 the plaintiffs’ failure
to assert that financial information was breached,128 and the plaintiffs’
failure to assert that any of their financial information that was
breached was capable of misuse.129 These cases seem to support a
general rule that an increased risk of harm arising from a data breach
is a cognizable injury-in-fact, even without an explicit showing of
misuse, when the plaintiff alleges that the breach resulted in an
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive PII that is capable of misuse and
the plaintiff files the claim in a reasonably expeditious manner.
C.

Explaining the Divergent Outcomes
1. Ripeness Concerns

Federal courts may be declining to recognize factual injuries in
data breach cases because those courts believe that the claims are not
ripe for adjudication.130 Because ripeness doctrine prevents judicial
review when an injury is speculative and may never occur,131 ripeness
and standing often appear to be conflated inquiries that observers
struggle to differentiate.132 It is possible that courts are applying
ripeness considerations under the guise of standing doctrine in an
attempt to determine when parties should litigate these claims, as
opposed to determining whether the parties are sufficiently adverse,
as standing doctrine requires. However, in data breach cases, the rule
of decision from the applicable precedent already supplies a simple
126. See, e.g., Foster v. Essex Prop. Tr., No. 5:14-CV-05531-EJD, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 159573, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2015); Antman v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:15CV-01175-LB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141945, at *29–30 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2015);
Fernandez v. Leidos, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1086–87 (E.D. Cal. 2015).
127. See Fernandez, 127 F. Supp. 3d at 1087–88. This factor could be relevant to the
imminence inquiry on the grounds that a prolonged period after PII exposure but before
misuse suggests that a hacker did not intend to misuse PII at all. That analysis, however,
seems purely speculative since courts cannot ascertain an unidentifiable data thief’s intent.
128. See Foster, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159573, at *8.
129. See Antman, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141945, at *29–30.
130. As noted, “[The] ripeness doctrine seems to separate matters that are premature
for review because the injury is speculative and may never occur from those cases that are
appropriate for federal court action.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
119 (6th ed. 2012).
131. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563–64 (1992).
132. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 130, at 119–20 (“Although the phrasing makes the
questions of who may sue and when they may sue seem distinct, in practice there is an
obvious overlap between the doctrines of standing and ripeness.”).
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answer to the question of whether the parties are seeking to litigate a
matter that is capable of redress.133 Therefore, courts should look to
substantive law—and not to justiciability doctrines—to make this
determination.
2. Docket Control
Similarly, district courts could also be applying standing doctrine
in data breach cases as a mechanism to control their dockets. As the
number of data breach incidents continues to increase, judges could
reasonably anticipate that the number of data breach claims would
increase dramatically under a more permissive standing inquiry.
Hearing such claims would force courts across the country to spend
limited resources on complex and often novel questions of state
law.134 Thus, courts could function more efficiently by limiting the
number of data breach claims that are allowed to reach the merits.
Even if courts are taking this approach, however, the injury
requirement is a poor vehicle for docket control. The Supreme Court
has insisted that the existence of a factual injury is a constitutional
requirement and not merely a prudential consideration that courts
can require at their discretion.135 Thus, when courts do apply the
injury-in-fact requirement in data breach litigation, they are creating
precedent regarding the cognizability of future injuries that could
affect all types of claims outside of the data breach context.
Therefore, courts should look to the merits of a claim to ensure that
prudential considerations that weigh in favor of a certain disposition
in a data breach case do not effectively become constitutional
requirements that could bar an otherwise cognizable claim in another
type of case.
III. THE “CERTAINLY IMPENDING” STANDARD IS INAPPOSITE IN
DATA BREACH LITIGATION
The federal courts’ divergent application of injury standards in
data breach litigation reveals that there is widespread confusion
regarding the cognizability of an increased risk of future harm as an
133. See infra Part IV.
134. Compare Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 167 (1st Cir. 2011)
(concluding that Maine negligence law allows recovery for financial losses such as
“identity theft insurance and replacement card fees” as mitigation damages so long as they
are reasonable), with Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 406 Fed. App’x 129, 131 (9th Cir. 2010)
(concluding that actual loss is a necessary element of a negligence claim under Washington
law).
135. See supra Part I.

95 N.C. L. REV. 201 (2016)

2016]

STANDING IN DATA BREACH CASES

221

injury-in-fact. The Supreme Court contributed to this confusion in
Clapper by simultaneously applying the “certainly impending”
standard from Lujan to determine the cognizability of such an injury,
declaring that an impending harm need not be “literally certain” to be
cognizable, and concluding that the “substantial risk” standard could
also be applied in the same inquiry.136 Specifically, after noting that
the “substantial risk” standard remained good law, the Court
concluded that the plaintiffs in Clapper would fail that standard due
to the “attenuated chain of inferences necessary to find harm” in that
case.137 Disappointingly, however, the Court failed to provide any
guidance to help lower courts understand the difference between the
“certainly impending” standard and the “substantial risk” standard.138
While the Supreme Court has failed to coherently explain why it
applied the more rigorous “certainly impending” standard in Clapper,
it is likely that the more exacting inquiry was applied because Clapper
was at its heart a separation of powers case in which the plaintiffs
looked to the federal courts to invalidate a law passed by Congress.139
Thus, insofar as the “certainly impending” standard requires a high
probability of a harm’s occurrence to render the harm cognizable,
that standard is inapposite in data breach litigation that does not
involve a separation of powers issue.140 Even if a risk need not be
substantial for Article III purposes, an application of the “substantial
risk” standard that requires a harm’s occurrence to be minimally
probable is better suited for these disputes between private parties. In
this way, more claims would rise or fall according to the bounds of the
underlying substantive law.

136. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147, 1150 n.5 (2013) (discussing
the “certainly impending” standard outlined in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555 (1993), and noting that an injury does not have to be “certainly” or “clearly”
impending to be cognizable).
137. Id.
138. See id. (acknowledging that the “substantial risk” standard is distinct from the
“clearly impending” standard but failing to elaborate on this distinction). Moreover, the
Court perpetuated this indecision when it acknowledged that both standards remain good
law in a subsequent case but failed to explain how courts should apply these two different
standards. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (“An
allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or
there is a ‘ “substantial risk” that the harm will occur.’ ” (quoting Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at
1150 n.5)).
139. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
140. See infra Section III.A.1.
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A. The Unhelpfulness of “Certainly Impending”
The Supreme Court’s inconsistent explanation of the “certainly
impending” standard’s meaning has rendered the term superfluous. In
formulating the injury-in-fact requirement, the Court has repeatedly
stated that a threatened harm must be “actual or imminent.”141 In
Clapper, the Court explained that imminence “ensure[s] that the
alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the
injury is certainly impending.”142 However, the words “imminent” and
“impending” mean essentially the same thing.143 Therefore,
“certainly” is the operative term in the standard and must have been
intended to add some clarity to the matter.144 Confusingly, in Clapper,
the Court went on to explain that a threatened harm need not be
“literally certain” in order to be a cognizable injury.145 The term
“certainly” is entirely capable of accommodating more than one
meaning,146 but if the Court insists that the term’s literal meaning does
not control, then the Court’s failure to offer anything more than “not
too speculative” as a definition147 may explain lower courts’ confusion
on the standard’s application.
The Court’s prior applications of the “certainly impending”
standard also do not add clarity to the standard’s precise meaning.
The Clapper majority opinion cited Lujan and Whitmore v.
Arkansas148 to support its statement that the imminence requirement
necessitates a showing that an asserted injury is “certainly
impending.”149 In Lujan, the plaintiffs alleged that they intended to
travel to the location where they would be subjected to the future
harm, but the plaintiffs did not allege a specific time at which they
planned to return.150 As a result, Justice Breyer argued in his dissent
141. E.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1993) (quoting Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
142. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2).
143. Compare Imminent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 621 (11th
ed. 2003) (defining “imminent” as “ready to take place”), with Impend, MERRIAMWEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra, at 623 (defining “impend” as “to be about
to occur”).
144. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. The Court indicated that “certain” was the
operative term in its elaboration of imminence indicated by its italicization of the word. Id.
145. Id. at 1150 n.5.
146. But see MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227 (1994) (“When
the word ‘modify’ has come to mean both ‘to change in some respects’ and ‘to change
fundamentally’ it will in fact mean neither of those things.”).
147. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992).
148. 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
149. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147.
150. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (stating that the plaintiffs’ assertion that they would return
“soon” did not sufficiently qualify as imminent).
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that the Court’s conclusion that the asserted future harm was not
“certainly impending” resulted from the Court’s application of the
standard as a measure of temporality.151 In Whitmore, the plaintiff’s
injury relied on an exceedingly “speculative” series of implausible
events,152 and on that ground, the Court declined to recognize an
injury-in-fact.153 Whitmore was also notable because it was the first
case where the Court construed the “certainly impending” standard
as a necessary measure of cognizable harm.154
The most logical way to read the Court’s applications of the
“certainly impending” standard is, however, that it refers to a
sufficient, but not necessary, measure of probabilistic harm.155 If one
151. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that the Lujan Court
used the “certainly impending” term “as if it concerned when, not whether, an alleged
injury would occur”). To the extent the construction of “certainly impending” in Lujan did
contemplate whether the alleged injury would occur, the Court also seemed to limit this
consideration to circumstances where the plaintiff controls the likelihood of the relevant
occurrence. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2 (“Although ‘imminence’ is concededly a somewhat
elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the
alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is ‘certainly
impending.’ It has been stretched beyond the breaking point when, as here, the plaintiff
alleges only an injury at some indefinite future time, and the acts necessary to make the
injury happen are at least partly within the plaintiff’s own control.” (citations omitted)).
152. In Whitmore v. Arkansas, Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed this “speculative”
series of events in humorous detail:
Whitmore’s principal claim of injury in fact is that Arkansas has established a
system of comparative review in death penalty cases, and that he has “a direct and
substantial interest in having the data base against which his crime is compared to
be complete and to not be arbitrarily skewed by the omission of any other capital
case.” Although he has already been convicted of murder and sentenced to death,
has exhausted his direct appellate review, and has been denied state postconviction relief, petitioner suggests that he might in the future obtain federal
habeas corpus relief that would entitle him to a new trial. If, in that new trial,
Whitmore is again convicted and sentenced to death, he would once more seek
review of the sentence by the Supreme Court of Arkansas; that court would
compare Whitmore’s case with other capital cases to insure that the death penalty
is not freakishly or arbitrarily applied in Arkansas. Petitioner asserts that he would
ultimately be injured by the State Supreme Court’s failure to review Simmons’
death sentence, because the heinous crimes committed by Simmons would not be
included in the data base employed for Whitmore’s comparative review. The
injury would be redressed by an order from this Court that the Eighth
Amendment requires mandatory appellate review.
495 U.S. 149, 156–57 (1990) (citations omitted) (quoting Brief for the Petitioner,
Whitmore, 495 U.S. 149 (No. 88-7146), 1989 WL 1127486, at *21).
153. Id. at 157.
154. See id. at 157–58 (stating that petitioner’s theory of injury was insufficient to
establish injury-in-fact for Article III standing).
155. This is true because, as Justice Breyer observed in his Clapper dissent, the Court
has also applied several other standards to determine whether an alleged future harm was
sufficiently imminent. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Taken
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assumes that “certainly impending” and “substantial risk” are distinct
standards, then each of the two standards is meant to be sufficient on
its own to demonstrate cognizable injury. Further, the Court’s
statement that a “certainly impending” injury is one that is not “too
speculative for Article III purposes” suggests that the standard should
be applied as a measure of probabilistic harm.156 This conclusion
raises two questions that are essential to understanding how either
standard should be applied in data breach litigation: what causes of
action should demand that a court apply one of these two standards
instead of the other,157 and what necessary minimum probability
would render a harm cognizable?158

together the case law uses the word ‘certainly’ as if it emphasizes, rather than literally
defines, the immediately following term ‘impending.’ ”).
156. See, e.g., id. at 1147 (majority opinion) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2). Lujan
offers mixed support for this assertion. The footnote that Clapper cites—and the sentence
that the footnote supports—applied imminence as if it encompassed both the questions of
whether and when the alleged harm would occur. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2 (concluding
that imminence “has been stretched beyond the breaking point when, as here, the plaintiff
alleges only an injury at some indefinite future time, and the acts necessary to make the
injury happen are at least partly within the plaintiff’s own control”). However, because the
Court was reviewing a determination on a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs
had an evidentiary burden that was higher than at the pleading stage. Id. at 561. For
instance, the Court would only accept as true those particular factual allegations that
plaintiffs set forth at the summary judgment stage. Id. Moreover, because the Court
concluded that the plaintiffs in Lujan were not the objects of the challenged government
action, the Court scrutinized the plaintiffs’ evidence in an even more exacting manner. Id.
at 562; see Scalia, supra note 17, at 894–95 (arguing that a plaintiff who challenges a
government regulation but is not the object of that regulation cannot establish standing
“[u]nless the plaintiff can show some respect in which he is harmed more than the rest of”
the citizenry). Therefore, the Court’s inquiry as to when the plaintiffs professed to subject
themselves to the asserted harm should be read as an evidentiary inquiry to determine
probability that was necessitated by the stage of the litigation—not by the “certainly
impending” standard itself. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64 (“Such ‘some day’ intentions—
without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the
some day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our
cases require.”); Hessick, supra note 13, at 64 (asserting that Lujan “stated that imminence
is relevant to justiciability only insofar as it relates to the probability that an injury will
occur”). But see Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155 (observing that an injury-in-fact “must be
concrete in both a qualitative and temporal sense”).
157. See Bradford C. Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty International: Two or Three
Competing Philosophies of Standing Law?, 81 TENN. L. REV. 211, 261–69 (2014)
(discussing different cases that have applied these two standards). For further discussion,
see infra Section III.A.1.
158. See infra Part IV. For further discussion, see Hessick, supra note 13, at 65–73.
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1. Applying the “Certainly Impending” Standard in Disputes
Between Private Parties
The Supreme Court has never applied the “certainly impending”
standard in a claim between two private parties; the standard has
been limited to separation of powers cases in which a plaintiff asks a
court to nullify an act of another branch of government.159 In fact, the
Court has only applied the “certainly impending” standard fifteen
times in its entire history.160 In thirteen of those cases, the plaintiffs
sought declaratory or injunctive relief arising from a governmental
action.161 In another case, a third party sought a stay of the execution
of a capital defendant.162 In the sole remaining case, a group of states
(and other parties) challenged an administrative agency’s denial of a
rulemaking petition and the agency’s corresponding construction of a
statute.163 Indeed, in each case except for the third-party standing
case, Whitmore v. Arkansas,164 the plaintiffs sought to invoke the
power of the judiciary against another branch of the federal
government.165
Whitmore presents a rather curious exception to the Court’s
pattern of applying the “certainly impending” standard in separation
of powers cases. In that case, Simmons, a capital defendant, elected to
waive his right to appeal his sentence.166 The plaintiff—another
capital inmate who had exhausted his own appellate review—sought
to intervene in the case.167 As an injury, the plaintiff alleged that the
state’s decision not to hear an appeal in Simmons’ case would deprive
the plaintiff of comparative review should he somehow obtain habeas
relief in the future.168 In holding that the plaintiff’s alleged injury was
insufficiently immediate to be cognizable, the Court reasoned that the
chain of events necessary for that injury to occur was too
speculative.169 As an alternative, the plaintiff also asserted that he
could demonstrate standing as a “next friend of . . . Simmons.”170 On
159. See F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-of-Powers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L.
Rev. (forthcoming Mar. 2017).
160. When narrowed to the U.S. Supreme Court, both LEXIS and Westlaw searches
performed in September 2016 of “certainly impending,” each generated fifteen results.
161. E.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 590 (1923).
162. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 151, 154 (1990).
163. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510–14 (2007).
164. See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 154.
165. E.g., Pennsylvania, 262 U.S. at 591.
166. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 153.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 157.
169. Id. at 159–60.
170. Id. at 161.
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that point, the Court concluded that the plaintiff would not have
satisfied the elements necessary to acquire “next friend” standing
because the plaintiff could not demonstrate that Simmons was unable
to litigate on his own behalf.171
There is little reason to conclude that Whitmore offers courts a
prescriptive precedent for applying the “certainly impending”
standard outside of separation of powers cases. In the entire opinion,
the Court only mentioned the standard once.172 The Court did not
even purport to apply the standard to reach its ultimate holding on
the issue.173 It is particularly notable that Whitmore was the first case
in the history of the Supreme Court to articulate the “certainly
impending” standard as a necessary requirement for standing and not
merely as a condition that would suffice to establish injury-in-fact.174
In light of these facts, the expression of the “certainly impending”
standard in Whitmore should not be read as an authoritative
statement of the Article III “case or controversy” requirement.175
Lujan is the most instructive case on the application of the
“certainly impending” standard as a necessary condition to establish
injury-in-fact. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts advanced the notion
that Article III courts were unsuited to provide redress for
majoritarian concerns.176 Consequently, in cases challenging
legislative or executive action, those courts applied a more rigorous
standing doctrine in response to concerns about an unwarranted
expansion of the federal judicial power.177 Lujan embodies that
theoretical framework and ensures that “plaintiffs are alleging their

171. Id. at 161–66. As the Court explained in Whitmore, “ ‘next friends’ appear in court
on behalf of detained prisoners who are unable, usually because of mental incompetence
or inaccessibility, to seek relief themselves.” Id. at 162.
172. See id. at 158.
173. See id. at 156–61.
174. Compare id. at 158 (“A threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending’ to
constitute an injury-in-fact.” (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S.
289, 298 (1979))), with Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298
(1979) (“But ‘[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to
obtain preventative relief. If the injury is certainly impending that is enough.’ ” (quoting
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923))).
175. Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Standing to Sue: Transformations in
Supreme Court Methodology, Doctrine and Results, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 93, 116 (1996)
(“The cite in Whitmore to Pennsylvania thus appears to be an attempt to support a higher
standard of injury with a precedent that, when properly read, does not lend itself to such
support.”).
176. Hessick, supra note 20, at 296.
177. Id. at 294–98.
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own, personal rights.”178 Thus, in a case where two parties dispute the
invasion of a common law right, there is no theoretical justification
for a more rigorous standing inquiry.179
It is important to offer the caveat that the Court may not have
intended to apply the “certainly impending” standard exclusively in
separation of powers cases. Thus, the Court may not have intended
for the standard to be applied more rigorously than any alternative
standard, including the “substantial risk” standard. Nonetheless,
because the Court has only applied the “certainly impending”
standard in separation of powers cases, and the Court has generally
applied standing doctrine more rigorously in these cases over the last
three decades, it is now difficult to read the standard without
reference to separation of powers principles.
In contrast to cases that implicate separation of powers
principles, in private rights cases, the Court’s insistence on factual
injury limits plaintiffs’ abilities to obtain judicial relief in “claims that
courts historically would have permitted.”180 The injury requirement
poses a related but unique problem in data breach cases where
plaintiffs allege so-called future injuries: the requirement routinely
denies federal jurisdiction to claims that often present novel questions
of state law.181 Thus, the application of the injury-in-fact requirement
poses a modern-day Erie problem.182 If a plaintiff brings a claim that a
state’s common law recognizes, then that plaintiff would nonetheless
be barred from bringing that claim in federal court because abstract
but binding federal precedent dictates that the resulting factual harm
is insufficiently probable.183 Yet, that result seems curious as a

178. Id. at 298–300. Moreover, this reading of Lujan comports with Clapper; as in
Clapper, the Court noted that the standing inquiry is more rigorous in separation of
powers cases. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013).
179. Hessick, supra note 20, at 304 (“In addition to being superfluous in cases involving
private rights, the injury-in-fact requirement in such cases has depleted the requirement of
objective meaning.”).
180. Id. at 277.
181. See, e.g., Burton v. MAPCO Express, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1284–85 (N.D.
Ala. 2014).
182. Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 253 (2008)
(“Properly understood, Erie sets forth a constitutional principle that federal judicial
lawmaking cannot dictate substantive rights where such lawmaking has only an
adjudicative rationale—that is, where it is justified solely on the basis that there is federal
authority to adjudicate a dispute or to create procedures for such adjudication.” (citing
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938))).
183. See Hessick, supra note 20, at 327 (“Requiring injury in fact in private rights cases
has not simply resulted in the denial of standing to plaintiffs alleging the violation of
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constitutional command that applies to all substantive claims because
courts have long granted standing for other types of prospective
injuries.184 In light of the historical application and theoretical
justification for the “certainly impending” standard, courts assessing
the imminence of future harms in data breach cases should apply the
“substantial risk” standard that Clapper preserved instead, which
notes that there must be a “substantial risk” that the future injury will
occur.185
IV. THE ROLE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
If courts hearing data breach cases did apply the “substantial
risk” standard instead of the “certainly impending” standard, the risk
of future harm needed to establish injury would be quite low.
Professor Andrew Hessick has offered a compelling argument that
Article III only demands an exceedingly low minimum probability
that an alleged harm will occur.186 At its essence, the injury
requirement can be reduced to a simple inquiry: who is the right
person to bring a particular claim?187 This inquiry, based on the
historical application of the doctrine, would turn on adverseness.188 In
this sense, even if a plaintiff alleges that he is only at a minimally
increased risk of suffering a harm caused by an action that a
defendant has already committed, then those two parties would have
adverse interests. Because the parties would be adverse, the
constitutional requirement would be satisfied.189 Hessick argues that
courts could then apply prudential considerations to shape their
jurisdictional limitations.190 With a clear distinction between a low
private rights. . . . [M]ost important[ly], it presents the threat of limiting jurisdiction in
future cases.”).
184. Hessick, supra note 13, at 67 (“[T]he fact that the injury might not occur does not
render the claim nonjusticiable; otherwise, federal courts would lack jurisdiction to hear
any claims for prospective relief because all potential future injuries have some chance of
not transpiring.”); see, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 160 (1990) (discussing
how future injuries must be “real and immediate”).
185. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
186. Hessick, supra note 13, at 67 (“Whether there is an actual dispute between two
parties is a binary question: there either is a dispute, or there is not. If a substantial risk of
injury constitutes an actual dispute, a small risk of injury does as well. The degree of risk
goes to the intensity of the dispute, not whether it exists at all.”).
187. E.g., Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 468 (2008)
(stating that the injury requirement “ensures that the federal courts hear only those
disputes characterized by the kind of adversary relationship that makes a legal ‘case’ or a
‘controversy’ ”).
188. See supra note 18 and accompanying text
189. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
190. Hessick, supra note 13, at 91–92.
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constitutional threshold for standing and any prudential
considerations that a court might apply,191 a court that adopted this
approach would “increase the legitimacy of judicial decisions by
promoting transparency.”192
In data breach cases, courts have held that preventative costs like
credit monitoring are not cognizable injuries unless the threat of
identity theft is sufficiently probable.193 For example, in addition to its
central holding, Clapper held that mitigation expenses are merely
future injuries when the alleged harms are not imminent.194 Yet, if
imminence is simply a question of probability, then it is difficult to
accept the notion that Article III commands both the aforementioned
result in data breach cases and opposite results in cases arising from
other causes of action such as toxic exposure or defective medical
devices.195 Rather, courts are actually engaging in normative inquiries
about the sorts of harms that should be cognizable.196 Courts could
ensure more predictable, doctrinally sound outcomes in data breach
cases by adopting Hessick’s test that only a minimal risk of harm is
required to satisfy the factual injury requirement.197 However, a
simpler and more direct solution198 in data breach cases would be to
identify the disclosure of sensitive PII as a factual harm that could
satisfy the factual injury requirement.199
A. The Normative Nature of the Factual Injury Requirement
In 1988, Judge William A. Fletcher of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit authored a seminal work on standing

191. Docket control is an example of one such consideration. See supra Section II.C.
192. Hessick, supra note 13, at 59.
193. E.g., Green v. eBay Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58047, at *5–6 (E.D.
La. May 4, 2015).
194. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013).
195. See Galbraith, supra note 4, at 1391–92 (“In either case, notwithstanding greater
harm that may result in the future, when a defendant creates a risk of harm requiring
monitoring costs, whether they are medical or financial costs, the damage has been
done.”). See generally Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1162–64 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing
how different kinds of cases, such as environmental cases, found plaintiff standing based
on a probabilistic or imminent risk of harm).
196. See infra Section IV.A.
197. See supra note 186–87 and accompanying text.
198. This solution would be simpler because it would encourage courts to permit more
claims to proceed to the merits without requiring them to speculate about the likelihood of
future events occurring.
199. See infra Section IV.C.
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doctrine, The Structure of Standing.200 Fletcher’s critical insight into
standing doctrine is that courts cannot apply the doctrine in both a
singular and coherent manner to all types of substantive claims.201
This is because the law provides remedies for the violation of legal
rights, and those violations manifest themselves in different factual
harms.202 Therefore, the controlling substantive legal authority, and
not “disembodied and abstract application[s] of general principles of
standing law[,]” dictates the acceptable legal injury and must then
determine the outcome of the standing inquiry.203
According to Fletcher’s positivist criticism of standing doctrine,
judicial insistence on a demonstration of factual injury obstructs the
essential question that the standing inquiry poses.204 Under this view,
the factual injury requirement set forth in Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp is inherently inoperative
“except in the relatively trivial sense of determining whether [the]
plaintiff is telling the truth about her sense of injury.”205 Rather, when
the Supreme Court applies a factual injury test to determine whether
someone has been harmed, the Court is actually applying external,
normative considerations about the sorts of harms that ought to be
cognizable.206 Moreover, when the Court rejects the premise that it
applies such norms, it necessarily fails to provide clear guidance to
lower courts on how to apply them.207 The result is that lower courts
then apply their own normative considerations disguised as
formalistic tests to reach unpredictable and divergent outcomes.208
B.

Data Breach Claims Under State Law

Data breach claims are often brought into federal court under
state law claims.209 Many courts that have applied the factual injury

200. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 221; see also Ernest A. Young, In Praise of Judge
Fletcher—And of General Standing Principles, 65 ALA. L. REV. 473, 473–74 (2013)
(discussing the lasting significance of Fletcher’s work).
201. See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 229.
202. Id. at 239.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 231.
205. Id. (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–54
(1970)).
206. Id.
207. See supra Section III.A.
208. See Elliot, supra note 187, at 501 (“No jurist can produce predictable results from
a set of rules that arises from incoherence.”); Fletcher, supra note 10, at 231 (arguing that
“the ‘injury-in-fact’ requirement cannot be applied in a non-normative way”).
209. See, e.g., In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F.
Supp. 3d 14, 21 (D.D.C. 2014).
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test in data breach cases have reached inconsistent conclusions on
similar facts,210 but one case illustrates the test’s normative nature
particularly well. In re Science Applications International Corp.
Backup Tape Data Theft Litigation (“SAIC”)211 considered the theft
of tapes containing sensitive information—including the names and
social security numbers—of millions of TRICARE beneficiaries.212
The tapes were stolen from the car of a Science Applications
International Corporation employee along with a GPS and a stereo.213
Just one of the thirty-three plaintiffs in the suit alleged that the
information that he provided to TRICARE had been misused.214
The court held that the plaintiffs who did not allege misuse could
not demonstrate that their injuries were “certainly impending.”215 In
so holding, the court reasoned that the degree to which the plaintiffs
were at a higher risk for identity theft was irrelevant under the
“certainly impending” standard.216 The court first determined in a
conclusory fashion that the alleged relevant harm was identity theft.217
The court then observed that “the likelihood that any individual
Plaintiff will suffer harm remains entirely speculative” because there
was no indication that the thief would recognize that the tapes
contained data or possess the tools or knowledge to decrypt that
data.218 Finally, applying Clapper, the court held that the plaintiff’s
mitigation expenses could not qualify as actual injuries because the
alleged harm—identity theft—was not imminent.219
Next, the court held that the plaintiffs who did not allege misuse
could not demonstrate that their harms presented a sufficiently
“substantial risk” of occurring to establish injury-in-fact.220 In so
holding, the court noted that 19% of individuals whose data is
exposed in a breach become victims of identity theft,221 and therefore,
210. See supra Sections II.A.–II.B.
211. 45 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2014).
212. Id. at 19. TRICARE is the U.S. military’s health system. See About Us,
TRICARE, http://www.tricare.mil/About [https://perma.cc/VG45-HHSY] (last updated Sept.
14, 2016).
213. In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d
at 20.
214. Id. at 32.
215. Id. at 28.
216. Id. at 25.
217. Id. The court’s analysis thus failed to consider whether the substantive law
recognized that expending resources to mitigate the invasion of a legal right could be a
legal injury. See infra Section IV.C.
218. In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d at 25.
219. See id. at 26.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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over 80% of data breach victims were not likely to have their
identities stolen.222 Moreover, and with little support for its
conclusion, the court then noted that even fewer of the victims in this
case were likely to become victims of identity theft because the theft
was unsophisticated.223
The SAIC court’s analysis demonstrates the normative nature of
courts’ application of the factual injury test in data breach cases that
arise under common law.224 The problems posed by the court’s
construction of the term “certainly impending” have been
addressed.225 Notably, though, the court also failed to define the term
“substantial,” and indeed the term’s definition suggests that it invites
a normative application.226 Thus, the court’s conclusion that a 19%
chance of identity theft is insubstantial is not supported by a generally
applicable empirical test.
For example, imagine that a group of consumers who were
exposed to a toxic chemical brought a common law claim against a
business in the same jurisdiction as the SAIC plaintiffs. Assume that
the exposure rendered the consumers with a 19% chance to develop a
terminal cancer. It seems reasonable that the consumers who faced a
19% risk of terminal cancer would regard that risk as quite
substantial. Yet, the SAIC court’s test would erect a federal
jurisdictional bar to those consumers’ claims—even though courts
routinely permit such suits.227 Moreover, if the substantive body of
law did provide a remedy for the preventative expenses necessary to
detect both the onset of the terminal cancer and the occurrence of
identity theft, then what would be the constitutional basis to
recognize the harm in one case but not the other? Regardless of what
the SAIC court should have done, this example demonstrates the
normative nature of the applicable test.228
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. The plaintiffs pled many causes of action, including negligence. Id. at 21.
225. See supra Section III.A.
226. See Substantial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note
143, at 1245 (defining “substantial” as “considerable in quantity: significantly great”);
Considerable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 143, at 266
(defining “considerable” as “large in extent or degree”); Significant, MERRIAMWEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 143, at 1159 (defining “significant” as
“of a noticeably or measurably large amount”); Great, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 143, at 547 (defining “great” as “remarkable in
magnitude, degree, or effectiveness”).
227. See Galbraith, supra note 4, at 1388–90.
228. See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 229–34 (discussing the normative considerations
that contribute to various applications of the injury-in-fact rule).
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A Less Rigorous Standing Inquiry

Another example of the incoherent, normative nature of
standing doctrine in data breach litigation is the widespread
agreement among courts that alleging misuse suffices to establish
injury-in-fact, while merely alleging exposure to misuse does not
suffice.229 Both exposure and misuse of PII are harms that are
sufficiently concrete to allow identification of particular parties with
adverse interests. Moreover, both exposure and misuse are factual
harms that are unrelated to the question of whether the applicable
substantive law provides a remedy for the preventative measures that
an affected consumer would likely take. Given that there is no
applicable empirical test to determine when a risk of harm is
sufficiently substantial to become imminent (or that such a test could
be consistently applied), it seems doubtful that a distinction between
exposure and misuse of PII is necessarily appropriate. For example,
mere exposure of a consumer’s social security number could make a
consumer vulnerable to a more severe and enduring risk than actual
misuse of a credit card if the card brand refunded the fraudulent
expense and closed the account.
Courts can resolve this doctrinal incoherence by allowing claims
where plaintiffs in data breach litigation allege disclosure of sensitive
PII230 to proceed to the appropriate inquiry on the merits. Courts
could do so in two ways that should satisfy the constitutional demands
imposed by Article III: by applying the “substantial risk” standard
while requiring only a low probability of a harm’s occurrence for less
sensitive PII, or by recognizing exposure of sensitive PII as a
cognizable injury. Because the substantive law of various states differs
on critical aspects of a data breach claim, such as the provision of
damages for measures taken to prevent financial loss incurred after
one’s sensitive PII is exposed in a data breach,231 there should not be a
jurisdictional bar from bringing such claims in some federal courts
and not others when the claims arise from identical facts. One may or
may not have a right to keep one’s data from being breached, but
regardless of how one answers that question, the ultimate arbiter
should be the relevant substantive law.

229. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
230. Sensitive PII would include all information capable of resulting in economic harm,
such as financial information or social security numbers.
231. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Allowing more consumers to establish standing in data breach
litigation does not mean that a new flood of cases would necessarily
proceed to trial. Parties must still bring a dispute to the court that
warrants judicial resolution. Alleging that a data breach caused the
disclosure of one’s name and phone number, for example, would
probably not expose someone to any significant risk of financial loss.
Moreover, if these claims survived the standing inquiry, they would
still be susceptible to motions to dismiss or summary judgment
motions. Courts’ inquiries at those stages of the proceedings could be
better tailored to the requirements of the applicable state law, and
litigants would also gain the benefit of being better able to forecast
their liability and take the necessary measures to prevent litigation
altogether.
The differences in requirements for actionable claims under the
substantive law of various states also demonstrate the need for
Congress to enact a federal data security scheme with a private right
of action. Data breach cases arising from the security practices of
large retailers can include plaintiffs from all fifty states.232 One large
claim can accordingly raise novel questions of many states’ laws and
complicate litigation strategies. Moreover, consumers should be
entitled to some redress if corporations fail to maintain reasonable
security standards. Credit card brands can mandate that their
interests are protected,233 but if these claims cannot be maintained as
class actions, many consumers could be unable to maintain their own
separate actions. Until Congress acts, however, standing doctrine
should not obstruct litigation from shaping the development of
reasonable data security standards.
**
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232. See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1160 (D.
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